As the pressure mounts on Turkey to resolve its ‘Syrian problem,’ President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is seemingly willing to resort to dramatic measures by attempting to court his long-term adversary, Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria. This move clearly signifies the escalating crisis in north-western Syria, which is having a significant impact on Turkey.
Erdogan has historically maintained a turbulent relationship with Assad. Both leaders have attacked each other over political and territorial disagreements, and only a few years ago, Erdogan referred to Assad as a ‘terrorist.’ The shifting stance illustrates both the pragmatism of Erdogan and the rising urgency of the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey.
As Turkey plays host to over 3.6 million Syrian refugees, growing domestic pressure to find a solution has caused Erdogan to reassess his attitudes towards Syria and its leadership. Over time, the refugee crisis has created serious socioeconomic and political obstacles for Turkey. The increasing costs of refugee support, along with rising social tensions, have resulted in growing dissatisfaction among Turkish citizens, leading to ongoing protests and calls for action from Erdogan’s government.
Seeing Assad as key to resolving this issue, Erdogan is currently pursuing diplomatic channels for dialogue, marking a significant shift from his prior stance. This development could potentially promote the process of refugee repatriation and restore peace in the complex region, ultimately resolving Turkey’s ‘Syrian problem.’
However, Erdogan’s move doesn’t come without controversy, as this decision has not sat well with the international community. Allies that have historically supported Turkey in its Syrian policy may see this courtship as a betrayal and could reassess their alliances accordingly. Furthermore, this could potentially damage Turkey’s international reputation since forming alliances with an internationally recognized ‘terrorist’ might be seen as a compromising position.
On the domestic front, Erdogan is navigating a precarious political landscape. The Turkish public, much of which is disillusioned by the government’s handling of the refugee crisis, remains divided on the issue. A portion of the public could potentially see Erdogan’s potential alliance with Assad as a capitulation to pressure, which might further erode the president’s authority in the country.
On the other hand, Erdogan’s attempt at appeasement may work in his favor if he is successful in repatriating the refugees to their homeland. If Assad accepts the overtures and assistance is given to Turkey amidst its current crisis, it could alter public opinion, leading to a strengthened Erdogan position both domestically and regionally.
In conclusion, Erdogan’s attempt to court ‘terrorist’ Assad represents a fresh – if controversial – approach to solving the ‘Syrian problem’ that Turkey faces. This move illustrates Erdogan’s willingness to swallow his pride and make pragmatic decisions under pressure. The potential success or failure of this endeavor will undoubtedly have significant implications for Turkey, the Syrian conflict, and regional dynamics in the Middle East.
